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What Test Scores Can and Cannot Tell Us 
About the Quality of Our Schools
   
ow to best judge the quality of our schools is a 
thorny issue. Now, the No Child Left Behind 
Act, which was signed into law in January 
2002, mandates standardized testing in math 
and reading for students in grades three through eight.
The test scores will then be used both to gauge the
students’ level of proficiency in these subjects and to
evaluate the schools’ performance. But emphasizing test 
scores as a measurement of the quality of schools raises 
several questions. In this article, Ted Crone looks at some 
of these questions and warns us to be cautious in how we 
use test scores.
On January 8, 2002, President 
Bush signed into law the No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB), the latest 
reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act. When fully 
implemented, the new law will require 
that students in grades three through 
eight take statewide standardized 
tests every year in math and reading. 
The scores on these tests will be used 
to determine whether students have 
achieved the required level of profi-
ciency in these subjects for their grade 
level.  Schools will be evaluated and 
rewarded or penalized on the basis of 
the test results. Since states are obli-
gated under the law to release annual 
report cards on the schools, the gen-
eral public is also likely to view these 
test scores as the primary measure of 
school quality. 
This increased emphasis on 
standardized test scores as a measure of 
school quality and a tool for account-
ability raises the issue of what test 
scores can and cannot tell us about 
the quality of our schools. Should we 
be looking at average test scores or 
changes in test scores as the measure 
of quality? How much of a difference 
in either of these measures is signifi-
cant? Finally, how can we distinguish 
the school’s contribution to these test 
scores from the effects of the students’ 
innate abilities, their family, social, 
and economic backgrounds, and the 
abilities and backgrounds of their peers 
in the classroom?
LARGE-SCALE TESTING
IS NOT NEW TO THE
U.S. EDUCATION SYSTEM
The beginning of large-scale 
external testing in the U.S., that is, 
tests developed outside the schools in 
which they are used, goes back to the 
mid-19th century.1 Initially, such test-
ing was limited. But the use of stan-
dardized tests increased significantly 
in the two decades after the develop-
ment and publication of the Stanford 
Achievement Test in 1923. Between 
World War II and the 1960s, standard-
ized tests were primarily used to evalu-
ate students and curricula; they were 
not commonly used to hold schools 
accountable for student performance. 
Except for tests such as the SAT, 
which is used for college admissions, 
there were few direct consequences for 
the students or the schools associated 
with the scores on standardized tests. 
In the 1960s two new pro-
grams at the national level expanded 
the role for large-scale testing. Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act, enacted in 1965, provided 
federal funds to schools with a large 
percentage of low-income students.  
The act required the periodic testing 
of students in the program to assess its 
effectiveness. Also, in the late 1960s, 
the Education Commission of the 
States sponsored the first set of tests 
1 For a brief history of large-scale testing in the 
U.S., see the report from the U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment. See also the 
article by Laura Hamilton and Daniel Koretz, 
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cism for being too narrowly focused 
and not testing higher-level skills. A 
second wave of reform in the 1990s 
introduced standardized tests that 
were not as dependent on the multiple-
choice format and that emphasized 
a broader range of skills. These were 
sometimes referred to as “tests worth 
teaching to.” Assessment programs 
also began to rely on other measures in 
addition to test scores to evaluate stu-
dents’ achievement levels (for example, 
portfolios of students’ work, presenta-
tions, and longer term projects).
Despite the reform efforts 
in the 1980s and 1990s and some im-
provement in national scores, achieve-
ment levels of U.S. students remained 
unacceptably low at the beginning of 
this century, giving rise to 
the testing requirements of 
NCLB. (See Achievement 
Levels of U.S. Students.)  
NCLB mandates yearly test-
ing in math and reading in 
grades three through eight no 
later than the 2005-06 school 
year.4 States are allowed to 
develop and administer their 
own tests, but they must 
specify what constitutes the 
acceptable level of proficiency 
for each grade. A sample of 
fourth and eighth graders 
from each state must also 
participate in the state-level 
NAEP tests every other year 
to provide a basis of compari-
son with the state’s own tests. 
NCLB requires that all 
students in each school reach the 
state-designated proficiency level on 
the state’s own tests by the end of 
the 2013-14 school year. Prior to the 
holding students accountable; as such, 
they require that each student take the 
test and that a cutoff score be estab-
lished to determine who meets the 
minimum competency level. Results 
from these types of tests are likely al-
ways to be considered the best measure 
of academic competency for primary 
and secondary students.
The role of large-scale 
standardized tests expanded again in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Besides using 
standardized tests to hold students ac-
countable, states began to use them to 
hold schools accountable, rewarding or 
penalizing schools based on test scores 
(the so-called high-stakes testing).3
The first wave of reform began in the 
early 1980s and was given momentum 
by the publication of A Nation at Risk, 
a critical report on the state of Ameri-
can education by the National Com-
mission on Excellence in Education. 
By the end of the decade many of the 
standardized tests introduced in this 
first wave of reform came under criti-
known as the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP). These 
tests have been administered periodi-
cally since 1969 to a random sample 
of 9-, 13-, and 17-year-olds in reading, 
math, and science to measure progress 
over time. A parallel set of NAEP 
tests was developed in the 1980s to be 
given in specific grades rather than to 
students based on their age. Besides 
being given to a national sample, this 
set of tests is given every two years to 
a sample of fourth and eighth graders 
in participating states and provides a 
basis of comparison among the states.
At the state level, large-scale 
standardized testing took on a new 
role in the 1970s. Many states adopted 
minimum-competency testing as a 
requirement for promotion or gradu-
ation or as a benchmark for assigning 
students to remedial programs. Prior 
to 1975, only two states had mandated 
any kind of minimum competency 
test; by 1980, however, 29 states had 
mandated such tests.2 Minimum com-
petency tests are essentially a tool for 
3 Test scores are also the most frequently used 
output measure in studies that estimate the 
effects of various school inputs; see the 1997 
article by Eric Hanushek.
4 NCLB continues the previous requirement that 
students be tested at least once in these two 
subjects in grades 10-12. By the 2007-08 school 
year, states will be required to test students in 
science at least once in the grade spans 3-5, 6-9, 
and 10-12. 
2 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology As-
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2013-14 school year, schools that have 
not reached 100 percent proficiency 
must make adequate yearly progress 
toward that goal.5 Adequate progress 
must be made for all students and for 
major subgroups of students (by race, 
ethnicity, income, and disability). The 
penalties for not achieving adequate 
progress become progressively severe.
For students in any school 
that fails to make adequate progress 
for two consecutive years, the district 
must provide them with a choice of 
public schools they can attend, and the 
state may be required to spend up to 5 
percent of its federal funds under Title 
I to pay for that option. Subsequent 
years of inadequate progress result in 
further penalties.  After five con-
secutive years of inadequate progress, 
districts are required to set up an al-
ternative governance structure for the 
school. This could include reconstitut-
ing it as a charter school, turning over 
management to a private company, 
or having the state run the school. 
Thus, NCLB has significantly raised 
the stakes for schools based on student 
performance on standardized tests. 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO 
STANDARDIZED TEST SCORES 
MEASURE SCHOOL QUALITY 
OR PERFORMANCE?
Individual Student Scores. 
Scores on standardized tests are 
primarily a measure of student 
achievement or competence in the 
subject being tested. They provide a 
better basis of comparison between 
students in different classrooms or 
different schools than scores on 
teacher-generated tests or course 
grades. Standardized test scores are 
not a perfect measure of achievement 
or competence, however. A written 
test cannot capture the full range 
of a student’s abilities, and every 
test involves a certain amount of 
measurement error.6 The reliability 
of a test is measured by the standard 
error of measurement or the degree 
to which the scores would spread out 
around the average score if the same 
student took the test many times. The 
measurement error on standardized 
tests can stem from a number of 
random factors, such as the student’s 
health on the day of the test, the form 
of the test the student receives, or how 
well the student slept the night before. 
A mark of a well-designed test is that 
the measurement error is small relative 
to the range of scores on the test. For 
example, scores for the SAT I test 
used for college admissions range from 
200 to 800, and the standard error of 
measurement is 30 points. In practice, 
this means that a test-taker could be 
68 percent sure that her score on the 
test is within 30 points either way of 
her “true score” or average score if she 
took the test many times. She could be 
95 percent sure that her score on the 
test is within 60 points either way of 
her true score. 
The existence of measure-
ment error raises a serious issue for 
minimum competency tests. There 
will be some misclassification in both 
directions when cutoff scores are used 
to determine which students meet the 
minimum level of proficiency. Each 
time the test is given, some students 
who are above the required achieve-
ment level are likely to score below 
the minimum and vice versa. For 
this reason most states that require a 
minimum proficiency score allow the 
students to take the test several times.7
Unless students are allowed to take 
minimum competency tests more than 
once, the temptation will always be to 
lower the cutoff score to account for 
the measurement error in a single test 
score. The incentive to lower profi-
ciency levels on tests is compounded 
by the fact that the national legisla-
tion provides no national standard for 
proficiency. Each state is allowed to set 
its own proficiency levels.
Average School Scores.
Although tests are primarily a mea-
sure of individual student achieve-
ment, average scores or the percent 
of students scoring above a certain 
level are increasingly being used as 
measures of school quality and ac-
countability. Usually a school will have 
some students with high scores and 
some with low scores, so the average 
score for the school will be somewhere 
in between, and the range of average 
scores across schools is much narrower 
than the range of individual scores 
for all students. For example, on the 
math and reading tests administered to 
fifth, eighth, and 11th graders as part 
The measurement error on standardized tests 
can stem from a number of random factors, 
such as the student’s health on the day of the 
test, the form of the test the student receives, 
or how well the student slept the night before. 
5 There is some exception to the 100 percent 
goal for the learning disabled.
6 See the article by Vi-Nhuan Le and Stephen 
Klein.
7 See Chapter 3 of the report from the Center 
on Education Policy. Of the 19 states that had 
adopted a high-school exit exam in 2003, all 
but one allowed students to take the test two or 
more times. The one exception was Washington 
State, and the state’s minimum competency 
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of the Pennsylvania System of School 
Assessment (PSSA) in 2002, the range 
for school scores was only 50 percent 
to 60 percent as wide as the range 
for individual student scores in the 
state.8 Researchers have consistently 
found that most of the variation in test 
scores is accounted for by the variation 
in individual students’ scores within 
schools rather than by the variation 
between schools.9  Thomas Kane and 
Douglas Staiger (2002b) report that 
the variation in fourth-grade math 
and reading scores in a typical North 
Carolina school is about 90 percent 
as large as the variation among all 
the state’s fourth graders. The large 
variation in scores within schools is 
an argument for the NCLB require-
ment that not only schools as a whole 
but also major subgroups within each 
school make adequate yearly progress 
toward proficiency. 
Since average scores for 
schools will be reported in states’ an-
nual reports, it is important to under-
stand how reliable these average scores 
are and how well they measure the 
quality of the school. Average scores 
for a class are a more reliable measure 
of the “true” class average than is any 
individual’s score of his true aver-
age. Many of the random factors that 
8 For example, the individual math scores for 
the 11th grade ranged from 700 (at the first 
percentile) to 1893 (at the 99th percentile); the 
average school scores ranged from 770 (at the 
first percentile) to 1460 (at the 99th percentile). 
See the report from the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Education.
9 In general, the variation among schools’ 
average scores accounts for only 10 percent to 
20 percent of the total variation in test scores; 
the rest is due to variation among individual 
students within schools. The Coleman report 
in the mid 1960s found that nationally about 
16 percent or less of the variation in reading 
and math scores on achievement tests for sixth, 
ninth, and 12th graders could be attributed to 
variation across schools. David Figlio (February 
13, 2002) reported that only 14 percent to 15 
percent of the variation in math and reading 
scores in two Florida school districts could be 
attributed to the variation between schools.
affect individual students’ scores (for 
example, a student’s health or the form 
of the test) tend to cancel out when 
scores are averaged across an entire 
class.  However, some random factors, 
such as a distraction in the classroom, 
poor lighting, or imprecise instructions 
from the teacher, can affect average 
scores for the class as a whole.  In 
their study of math and reading scores 
for fourth graders in North Carolina 
from 1992 to 1999, Kane and Staiger 
estimated that these types of random 
factors accounted for a relatively small 
percentage of the variation in average 
school scores — only 3.6 percent of the 
total variation among mid-size schools 
(Table, column 2, row 1).10
How much of the remaining 
variation in average test scores is due 
to differences in the instructional qual-
ity of the schools? Certainly, not all 
of it. Some of the variation in average 
scores across schools is due to differ-
ences in the quality of the students. 
The quality of students differs not 
only across schools and school districts 
but also across cohorts or age groups 
within the same school. In any given 
year, the students in a particular grade 
may be brighter than the students in 
other years even though they come from 
the same neighborhood. In their North 
Carolina sample, Kane and Staiger 
estimated that almost 11 percent of 
the variation in the combined reading 
and math scores for the fourth grade 
among mid-size schools is due to draw-
10 See Kane and Staiger, 2002b. Mid-size schools 
are those in the middle quintile by size; on aver-
age they have 56 fourth-grade students.
ing a different sample of students from 
the neighborhood each year (Table, 
column 3, row 1).11
Thus, for the typical school 
random factors and cohort effects (an 
abnormal number of good or poor 
students) account for about 15 percent 
of the variation in school scores. But 
these factors influence the average 
scores of smaller schools more than 
those of larger schools.  As a result a 
greater percentage of smaller schools 
tend to be at the top and bottom of the 
distribution of average scores in a given 
year. Kane and Staiger estimated that 
the combined effect of random factors 
and different cohorts accounts for less 
than 10 percent of the variation in 
average fourth-grade reading and math 
scores among the largest schools and 
almost 20 percent of the variation in 
scores among the smallest schools.12
NCLB recognizes the problems with 
the high variability in scores for small 
samples by not requiring that average 
scores be reported for subgroups when 
the number of children is small.
Most of the variation in the 
average level of test scores from school 
to school is persistent; that is, it is not 
due to factors that change on a yearly 
Most of the variation in the average level of 
test scores from school to school is persistent; 
that is, it is not due to factors that change on a 
yearly basis.
11  This does not include differences in the stu-
dent population across neighborhoods serviced 
by different schools.
12 The largest quintile of schools in North Caro-
lina has an average of 104 students in the fourth 
grade, and the smallest quintile has an average 
of 28 students in the fourth grade. The greater 
variability in test scores for smaller schools than 
larger schools due to these transitory effects has 
also been documented for Chile. See the paper 
by Kenneth Chay, Patrick McEwan, and Miguel 
Urquiola.8   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   9 www.phil.frb.org
% of Variance Due to % of Variance Due to % of Variance Due to
Persistent Characteristics Purely Random Differences in Cohorts
of the School Factors Within the School
     
Combined Reading and Math Scores
for Fourth Grade 85.4% 3.6% 10.9%
Change in Combined Reading and Math
Scores for Fourth Grade from One Year
to the Next
(Variation is 40 percent as great as variation
in scores across schools) 29.1% 16.4% 54.5%
Change in Combined Reading and Math
Scores from Third Grade to Fourth Grade
(Variation is 23 percent as great as variation
in scores across schools) 51.6% 35.5% 12.9%
Source: Author’s calculations from Kane and Staiger, 2002b, Table 2. Mid-size schools are those in the middle quintile based on size. 
Time frame: 1992-99.
TABLE
Sources of Variation in Fourth-Grade Test Scores
for Mid-Size Schools in North Carolina
(Average number of fourth graders = 56) 
basis. Kane and Staiger’s analysis of 
the variation in fourth-grade math 
and reading scores in North Carolina 
suggests that about 85 percent of the 
variation in the level of test scores 
across mid-size schools is persistent 
(Table, column 1, row 1). Evidence 
from the PSSA also shows that the 
relative differences in scores across 
schools are persistent. The correlation 
of 11th-grade scores for public high 
schools for consecutive years between 
1998 and 2002 is approximately 0.88 
for math and 0.80 for reading.13
Who’s Responsible for 
These Persistent Differences in Test 
Scores? Are these persistent differ-
ences a measure of the quality of the 
school or a measure of the abilities and 
backgrounds of the students? Econom-
ic studies of the educational process 
have identified three major influences 
on student achievement besides the 
quality of the school: the student’s in-
nate ability and family characteristics 
and the characteristics of the student’s 
classroom peers.14
Teachers are well aware of the 
wide range of student abilities from the 
learning disabled to the gifted. But it 
is difficult to get a pure measure of the 
innate ability of students. Initial test 
scores are not a pure measure of innate 
ability; by the time students enter the 
school system their achievement levels 
have been influenced by a number 
of environmental and social factors. 
Moreover, as students progress through 
the school system, their achievement 
levels are the result of their cumulative 
educational experience.
Family characteristics, such 
as the parents’ education and income, 
can also affect the level of student 
achievement and test scores. Education 
takes place not only in the classroom 
but also at home; in general, stu-
dents whose parents are more highly 
educated have a better educational en-
vironment in the home. For example, 
           
13 Although schools’ relative PSSA test scores 
are fairly stable across years, in every year 
between 1999 and 2002, there are examples of 
the average 11th grade math or reading score 
for a school moving from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile in the state or vice versa.
14 See the article by Byron Brown and Daniel 
Saks, and the 1979 and 1986 articles by
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students who are exposed to a richer 
vocabulary in their family conversa-
tions are more likely to perform better 
in language arts than students who 
are exposed to a limited vocabulary. 
Income matters as well. Higher income 
families can better afford certain aids 
to education, such as computers or pri-
vate tutors. In addition, students from 
higher income families are more likely 
to have more educational experiences 
like foreign travel.
Finally, a number of studies 
have found that the achievement levels 
and other characteristics of fellow 
students in the classroom can have 
an effect on a student’s own achieve-
ment and test scores — the so-called 
peer-group effect.15 Peers can provide 
motivation for a student. They can 
contribute to learning through direct 
interaction, or they can affect the 
learning process in the classroom. 
A disruptive student clearly hinders 
the learning process for his peers, but 
a bright student can aid the process 
by asking questions that help other 
students as well.16 A good set of peers 
in the classroom can increase the 
quality of the school by enhancing the 
learning environment, but in the U.S. 
public school system, classroom peers 
are largely determined by the families 
who choose to live in the neighbor-
hood, not by the school. 
The cumulative effect of 
students’ innate abilities, family back-
grounds, and peers will be reflected 
in tests scores. Schools, however, have 
little or no influence over these factors, 
raising the issue of how test scores can 
be used to judge the school’s contribu-
tion to learning. One suggestion is to 
use changes in test scores rather than 
the level of scores to measure school 
quality and performance.17
ARE CHANGES IN TEST 
SCORES A BETTER MEASURE 
OF SCHOOL QUALITY?
Changes in Scores for a 
Given Grade. There are several ways 
to measure changes in test scores in a 
system of school accountability.18  The 
first is to compare this year’s score for 
a given grade with last year’s score for 
that grade, for example, the change in 
the average test score for fourth grade.  
Of course, we are not comparing the 
same students in this exercise, and so 
it is difficult to know how much any 
increase in the average score represents 
an improvement in student achieve-
ment. The school’s contribution to this 
increase in the score is equally difficult 
to assess. Kane and Staiger estimate 
that more than 50 percent of the varia-
tion in the annual change in fourth-
grade reading and math scores across 
mid-size schools in North Carolina is 
due to the fact that a different cohort 
of students is being tested each year, 
and each cohort has a different average 
level of ability (Table, column 3, row 
2). 
Besides these cohort effects, 
random factors such as a large number 
of students with a cold on the day of 
the test can also contribute to the 
change in scores for a given grade from 
one year to the next. According to 
Kane and Staiger, the combination of 
cohort effects and these kinds of ran-
dom factors accounts for more than 70 
percent of the variation in the annual 
change in fourth-grade scores in North 
Carolina.19
Changes in Scores for a 
Given Cohort of Students. A partial 
solution to the problem of comparing 
two different cohorts of students is to 
compare this year’s average fourth-
grade score with last year’s third-grade 
score. But this is only a partial solution 
for two reasons: The composition of 
the class may have changed as some 
students enter or leave the class, and 
even if there has been no change in 
the composition of the class, different 
cohorts of students advance at differ-
ent rates. If a cohort of particularly 
able students has moved from third to 
fourth grade this year, a larger than 
average increase in scores may not be 
due to the school at all.  The change 
in scores from one grade to the next 
tends to be considerably less variable 
than the change in scores for a given 
grade. But even in this case, only about 
half the variation in the change in 
scores can be attributed to differences 
Random factors such 
as a large number of 
students with a cold 
on the day of the test 
can also contribute to 
the change in scores 
for a given grade from 
one year to the next.
15 See the articles by Anita Summers and 
Barbara Wolfe; Vernon Henderson, Peter 
Mieszkowski, and Yvon Sauvageau; Ron Zimmer 
and Eugenia Toma; Caroline Hoxby; and Erick 
Hanushek, John Kain, Jacob Markman, and 
Steven Rivkin. Peer-group effects are difficult to 
isolate and hard to separate from school effects, 
since students generally attend school for some 
years with most of their classroom peers. Joshua 
Angrist and Kevin Lang found only very weak 
evidence of peer-group effects in their study.
16 See the article by Edward Lazear and the one 
by Hanushek et al.
17 See Hanushek’s 1986 article, and the article 
by Hanushek and Lori Taylor.
18 See the article by Laura Hamilton and Daniel 
Koretz.
19 See Kane and Staiger, 2002b. In a study of test 
scores in Florida, David Figlio and Marianne 
Page found that the correlation between changes
in average test scores in consecutive years for a 
given grade at a school was negative, support-
ing the notion that changes in test scores are a 
noisy measure of school quality.10   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   11 www.phil.frb.org
20 Figlio and Page found that the ranking of 
Florida schools based on the improvement 
in individual scores is very different from the 
ranking based on the average level of scores in a 
given year. But the available data only allowed 
them to calculate the change in individual read-
ing scores from the fourth to the fifth grade.
21 In Kane and Staiger’s study of North Carolina 
schools, the correlation between individual 
students’ standardized third- and fourth-grade 
scores was 0.80.
in the quality of the schools (Table, 
column 1, row 3). Kane and Staiger 
estimate that in mid-size schools in 
North Carolina about 13 percent of 
the variation in the average change in 
test scores from third to fourth grade 
is due to the cohort that is advancing 
that year, and more than 35 percent is 
due to purely random factors (Table, 
columns 2-3, row 3). 
Changes in Individuals’ Test 
Scores. A more refined measure of the 
value added by a school is the improve-
ment in individual student scores over 
time rather than the improvement 
in class scores from one year to the 
next.20 Students’ test scores are highly 
correlated from one year to the next, 
so it may take a longer period to cap-
ture meaningful changes in a student’s 
scores compared to the average 
change.21 But data on individual stu-
dents’ test scores are difficult to main-
tain over time, especially for students 
who are very mobile. Furthermore, 
tracking individual students does not 
solve all the issues of identifying the 
school’s contribution to any improve-
ment in scores. Family background and 
innate ability influence not only the 
level of scores at a point in time but 
the rate of change as well. A student 
whose father or mother has a graduate 
degree in engineering is likely to get 
more help on his algebra homework 
and, therefore, advance more quickly 
than the student whose parents did not 
graduate from high school. Kane and 
Staiger found that students in North 
Carolina whose parents had a higher 
level of education had greater gains in 
test scores from the end of third grade 
to the end of fourth grade. Whether 
we compare schools based on the 
level of test scores or some measure of 
change in scores, the school’s contribu-
tion has to be determined in light of 
the innate abilities and backgrounds of 
the students.
Teaching to the Test. An-
other word of caution has to be raised 
about changes in scores on high-stakes 
tests whose results have serious con-
sequences for the school. No matter 
how we measure changes in test scores, 
there is a tendency in the early years 
after a new high-stakes test is intro-
duced for scores to rise rapidly. Daniel 
Koretz provides a striking example of 
inflation in high-stakes test scores.22
He and his colleagues tracked student 
22 See the article by Daniel Koretz, Robert Linn, 
Stephen Dunbar, and Lorrie Shepard, and both 
articles by Koretz.
performance in two school districts on 
several tests; some were high-stakes 
tests and some were not. The figure  
illustrates what happened to third-
grade math scores in one district that 
changed its high-stakes test between 
1986 and 1987. In the final year in 
which the old test was given, the me-
dian grade equivalent was 4.3 for the 
third graders in the district. In the first 
year of the new test, the grade equiva-
lent dropped to 3.7, but by the fourth 
year of administering the new test, 
the median grade had climbed back to 
4.3. In the fourth year of the new test, 
Koretz and his colleagues administered 
the old test to a random sample of 
third graders. Their median score on 
the old test was 3.7. Scores on the new 
district-wide test had increased sub-
stantially in the four years, and scores 
on the old test had dropped. 
The initial rapid rise in high-
stakes test scores is often attributed to 
the practice of “teaching to the test.” 
There is evidence that teachers do 
FIGURE
Median Grade Equivalent 
(Old Test and New Test)
Third-Grade Mathematics
Source: Daniel M. Koretz, Journal of Human Resources, 2002.
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spend more time on the subjects tested 
in their grade than on other subjects.23
In any given subject, teachers can 
emphasize the material they know 
will be covered on a high-stakes test. 
These are not necessarily negative 
consequences of high-stakes testing. If 
high-stakes tests adequately cover the 
essential material to be learned in each 
grade, these practices can enhance 
the teaching in the classroom. Teach-
ing to a well-designed set of tests can 
improve both test scores and student 
achievement. But we cannot assume 
that every improvement in test scores 
is an improvement in overall academic 
achievement. Some classroom prac-
tices improve test scores on high-
stakes tests but have little or no effect 
on achievement levels. For example, 
teachers learn over time how to ad-
minister tests with less confusion, and 
they prepare students for the format of 
the new high-stakes test. 
One check on whether higher 
test scores are measuring true gains 
in achievement or simply reflect score 
inflation is to compare the improve-
ment in scores on high-stakes tests 
with improvement in other test scores. 
Researchers have compared gains in 
several state-mandated tests with gains 
in the NAEP tests taken in the state. 
The results are mixed. Gains in test 
scores from the Kentucky Instructional 
Results Information System (KIRIS) 
were not matched by gains in the 
state’s NAEP scores.24  In the first two 
years of the program, fourth-grade 
reading scores increased dramatically 
on the KIRIS tests but did not increase 
at all on the NAEP tests. In the first 
four years of the program, fourth- and 
eighth-grade math scores increased 
three-and-a-half to four times more 
on the KIRIS tests than on the NAEP 
tests. Perhaps the most publicized high-
stakes testing program in the country 
has been the Texas Assessment of Ac-
ademic Skills (TAAS). Stephen Klein 
and his associates compared gains in 
TAAS scores from 1994 to 1998 with 
gains in the Texas NAEP scores.25 Both
sets of tests showed gains in reading 
and math in fourth and eighth grade, 
but the gains on the TAAS tests were 
much larger than those on the NAEP 
tests. Moreover, other educational 
outcomes such as graduation rates or 
plans to attend college have not im-
proved with the gains in the Texas test 
scores.26 Unlike the situation in Ken-
tucky and Texas, increases in scores 
on the North Carolina state tests were 
about the same as increases in the 
NAEP scores in the state. This may be 
because the North Carolina tests are 
more similar to the NAEP tests.27 The 
possibility of serious grade inflation on 
high-stakes test scores reinforces the 
need for a comparison test such as the 
NAEP, against which we can measure 
any improvement in high-stakes test 
scores. 
23 See the article by Brian Stecher.
24 See the paper by Daniel Koretz and Sheila 
Barron.
25 See the article by Stephen Klein, Laura Ham-
ilton, Daniel McCafferty, and Brian Stecher. 
Robert Linn, Eva Baker, and Damian Beteben-
ner also point out that the percent of students 
meeting proficiency levels in the TAAS tests 
increased much faster than the percent of 
students meeting proficiency levels on the Texas 
NAEP tests.
26 See the article by Martin Carnoy, Susanna 
Loeb, and Tiffany Smith.
27 See Thomas Kane and Douglas Staiger, 
2002a.
One check on whether higher test scores are 
measuring true gains in achievement or
simply reflect score inflation is to compare the 
improvement in scores on high-stakes tests 
with improvement in other test scores. 
SUMMARY:
SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON 
THE USE OF TEST SCORES TO
EVALUATE SCHOOL QUALITY
Test scores are primarily a 
measure of the achievement levels 
of individual students, but they are 
increasingly being used to measure 
the quality of schools.  This new role 
for testing is a response to the per-
formance of U.S. students relative to 
students from other industrialized 
countries and to the large percent-
age of U.S. students who do not meet 
proficiency levels on standardized tests. 
The new testing programs are designed 
to hold schools as well as students ac-
countable. Test scores and changes in 
test scores are one of the few quanti-
tative measures of school quality we 
have, but special precautions need to 
be taken when test scores are used to 
evaluate schools rather than students.
Perhaps the most popularly 
accepted notion in judging the quality 
of schools is that all students should 
achieve a minimum level of compe-
tency based on some standardized test 
in order to graduate or be promoted. 
But there is some measurement error 
in the score on every test, and some 
students who are above the minimum 
in achievement will not receive the 
minimum score on a single admin-
istration of the test. Therefore, if all 
students are required to score above 
the minimum on a single administra-
tion of the test, states will be tempted 
to lower the cutoff score for proficiency 
to account for the measurement error. 
Students should have more than one 
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on these tests, and this should be true 
of tests that have serious consequences 
for the school as well as those that 
have serious consequences for the 
students.
Average school scores are 
less susceptible to measurement error 
than individual student scores. But 
the average score may not measure the 
school’s contribution to the students’ 
achievement for several reasons. Each 
cohort of students in a school will 
differ in their abilities, and the family 
characteristics and innate abilities 
of students will differ from school to 
school. Moreover, peer effects can 
magnify these differences. Therefore, if 
we want to use average scores to judge 
the quality of schools, we must look at 
scores over several years and compare 
measure of school quality. 
Despite the shortcomings of 
standardized test scores as a measure 
of school performance there is no 
generally recognized substitute; test 
scores simply have to be used with 
caution. Improvements in high-stakes 
test scores should be checked against 
improvements in other tests such as 
the state-level NAEP tests. Other 
measures of student achievement, such 
as course grades and performance on 
longer-term projects, can be incor-
porated into the evaluation of school 
quality. Finally, other criteria, such as 
graduation rates and the percent of 
students attending college are impor-
tant in evaluating how well our schools 
perform.
scores for schools that have students 
from similar backgrounds.
Theoretically, changes in test 
scores should be a better measure of 
the school’s contribution to student 
achievement than average scores. 
But there is a lot of random variation 
in the changes in scores for a given 
grade or for a given class from one 
year to the next. Longer-term trends 
in test scores can eliminate some of 
this random variation in the changes 
in scores. But not all of the long-term 
improvement in class scores or indi-
vidual scores can be attributed to the 
school. Family characteristics and peer 
effects influence how quickly students 
advance in their education. So every 
easily accessible measure of student 
achievement has some drawback as a 
S
Appendix:  Achievement Levels of U.S. Students
ince the 1960s, a number of countries 
have administered math and science 
tests so that student achievement can be 
compared across countries. U.S. students 
have tended to score in the middle of 
the pack or lower in these international 
comparisons.a In the latest Third International Math-
ematics and Science Study (TIMSS) conducted in 1999, 
eighth-grade students in the U.S. ranked 19th in math 
among the 38 countries participating. In science, they 
ranked 18th out of 38 (Table A1). A number of explana-
tions have been offered for the poor ranking of the U.S. 
in the TIMSS tests relative to nations like Japan, Korea, 
the Netherlands, and Australia, but there are no simple 
explanations for the differences in performance across 
countries.b Nonetheless, the rankings suggest considerable 
room for improvement in the American education system. 
 The trend and dispersion in student achieve-
ment within the U.S. are illustrated by the scores on the 
two types of tests given as part of the National Assess-
ment on Educational Progress (NAEP) — the national 
trend tests and the state tests. The scores from the long-
term trend NAEP tests offer the best assessment of stu-
dent achievement over time, since the tests have changed 
very little since they were first administered. The average 
math and science scores on these tests show a pattern of 
deterioration in the 1970s, improvement in the 1980s, 
and a leveling off in the 1990s. The math scores have 
shown the most consistent improvement (Figures A1 and 
A2). Reading scores have shown little sustained improve-
ment since the tests were first administered (Figure A3). 
For all age groups (9, 13, and 17) the latest reading scores 
are not significantly higher than they were in 1980.c
The state-level NAEP tests, which were first 
administered in the early 1990s, differ from the tests that 
capture the national trend because they are adjusted over 
time to reflect changing curricula and they are given in 
specified grades, not at given age levels.  The National 
a See Eric Hanushek’s 1998 article. 
b See the article by Deborah Nelson. 
c See the report from the U.S. Department of Education. 
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TABLE A1
1999 TIMSS SCORES
8th Grade Math  8th Grade Science
Singapore 604 569 Chinese Taipei
Korea 587 568 Singapore
Chinese Taipei 585 552 Hungary
Hong Kong 582 550 Japan
Japan 579 549 Korea
Belgium 558 545 Netherlands
Netherlands 540 540 Australia
Slovak Republic 534 539 Czech Republic
Hungary 532 538 England
Canada 531 535 Belgium
Slovenia 530 535 Finland
Russian Federation 526 535 Slovak Republic
Australia 525 533 Canada
Czech Republic 520 533 Slovenia
Finland 520 530 Hong Kong
Malaysia 519 529 Russian Federation
Bulgaria 511 518 Bulgaria
Latvia 505 515 United States
United States 502 510 New Zealand
England 496 503 Latvia
New Zealand 491 493 Italy
Lithuania 482 492 Malaysia
Italy 479 488 Lithuania
Cyprus 476 482 Thailand
Romania 472 472 Romania
Moldova 469 468 Israel
Thailand 467 460 Cyprus
Israel 466 459 Moldova
Tunisia 448 458 Macedonia
Macedonia 447 450 Jordan
Turkey 429 448 Iran
Jordan 428 435 Indonesia
Iran 422 433 Turkey
Indonesia 403 430 Tunisia
Chile 392 420 Chile
Philippines 345 345 Philippines
Morocco 337 323 Morocco
South Africa 275 243 South Africa
Source: U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. Pursuing Excellence: Comparisons of 
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TABLE A2
Percent of Students Scoring Below Basic Level (NAEP)
Source: http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/
The three states in the Third Federal Reserve District are shaded.
Math  Reading
   
  4th Grade  8th Grade    4th Grade  8th Grade
Nation (public schools) 24 33    38 28
Alabama 35 47    48 35
Alaska 25 30    42 33
Arizona 30 39    46 34
Arkansas 29 42    40 30
California 33 44    50 39
Colorado 23 26    31 22
Connecticut 18 27    26 23
Delaware 19 32    29 23
District of Columbia 64 71    69 53
Florida 24 38    37 32
Georgia 28 41    41 31
Hawaii 32 44    47 39
Idaho 20 27    36 24
Illinois 27 34    39 23
Indiana 18 26    34 23
Iowa 17 24    30 21
Kansas 15 24    34 23
Kentucky 28 35    36 22
Louisiana 33 43    51 36
Maine 17 25    30 21
Maryland 27 33    38 29
Massachusetts 16 24    27 19
Michigan 23 32    36 25
Minnesota 16 18    31 22
Mississippi 38 53    51 35
Missouri 21 29    32 21
Montana 19 21    31 18
Nebraska 20 26    34 23
Nevada 31 41    48 37
New Hampshire 13 21    25 19
New Jersey 20 28    30 21
New Mexico 37 48    53 38
New York 21 30    33 25
North Carolina 15 28    34 28
North Dakota 17 19    31 19
Ohio 19 26    31 22
Oklahoma 26 35    40 26
Oregon 21 30    37 25
Pennsylvania 22 31    35 24
Rhode Island 28 37    38 29
South Carolina 21 32    41 31
South Dakota 18 22    31 18
Tennessee 30 41    43 31
Texas 18 31    41 29
Utah 21 28    34 24
Vermont 15 23    27 19
Virginia 17 28    31 21
Washington 19 28    33 24
West Virginia 25 37    35 28
Wisconsin 21 25    32 23
Wyoming 13 23    31 2116   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   17 www.phil.frb.org
Assessment Governing Board, which oversees the test, 
has adopted three achievement levels for reporting the 
results — basic, proficient, and advanced.d The basic level 
“denotes partial mastery of prerequisite knowledge and 
skills that are fundamental for proficient work at each 
grade” (www.nagb.org/about/achievement.html). 
The No Child Left Behind Act required all 
states to participate in these tests for fourth- and eighth-
grade students by the 2002-03 school year. The results 
were not encouraging (Table A2). Nationwide, 24 percent 
of fourth-grade public-school students and 33 percent of 
eighth graders scored below the basic level in math. Even 
in the best performing states, 13 percent of fourth graders 
and 18 percent of eighth graders scored below the basic 
level. In the three worst performing states, more than 
one-third of the fourth graders scored below the basic 
level and in 10 states more than 40 percent of the eighth 
graders scored below basic.e On the reading tests 38 
percent of fourth graders and 28 percent of eighth graders 
nationwide scored below the basic level. Even in the best 
performing states, 25 percent of fourth graders and 18 
percent of eighth graders scored below basic. In the 13 
worst performing states, more than 40 percent of fourth 
graders scored below basic in reading, and in seven states, 
more than one-third of the eighth graders scored below 
basic in reading. These results suggest that the need for 
improvement in student achievement is not limited to a 
few states or school districts.
d These are not related to the proficiency levels to be determined by each state according to the No Child Left Behind Act.
e These numbers exclude the District of Columbia where more than 50 percent of the fourth- and eighth-grade students scored below 
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FIGURE A1
Average Math Scores (NAEP)
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics. NAEP 1999, Trends in Academic Progress: Three Decades of Student Performance.18   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   19 www.phil.frb.org
FIGURE A2
Average Science Scores (NAEP)
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics. NAEP 1999, Trends in Academic Progress: Three Decades of Student Performance.18   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   19 www.phil.frb.org
FIGURE A3
Average Reading Scores (NAEP)
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics. NAEP 1999, Trends in Academic Progress: Three Decades of Student Performance.20   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   21 www.phil.frb.org
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